Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power by Glaser, Howard B.
Pace Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 1 Spring 1994 Article 3
April 1994
Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power
Howard B. Glaser
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 Pace L. Rev. 111 (1994)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/3
Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of
Inherent Power
Howard B. Glaser*
'We are faced with the paradox that litigation designed to solve a
problem makes its solution less likely."'
I. Introduction
On December 31, 1990, New York Governor Mario M.
Cuomo entered the paneled chambers of the state Court of Ap-
peals, where he began his legal career thirty years earlier as a
law clerk, and stepped-up to face Chief Judge Sol Wachtler. 2
The Governor and the Chief Judge were long-time friends and
some-time rivals: the Democratic Governor had appointed the
Republican jurist Chief Judge in 1985.3 Governor Cuomo had
asked Chief Judge Wachtler to preside over the ceremony mark-
ing the Governor's third inauguration. As the Chief Judge ad-
ministered the oath of office to the Governor, neither man could
anticipate that in the coming year they would face each other
again in a New York courtroom, not to celebrate democracy, but
to test it in the most severe constitutional crisis in New York
State's history. The confrontation was spawned by New York's
grim fiscal condition, when the Governor, four weeks after his
swearing in, announced unprecedented budget cutbacks
throughout state government, including the court system.4 The
Chief Judge responded with a lawsuit, which asserted that the
judiciary had "inherent power" to compel the executive and leg-
* Affiliated with Hill & Barlow, Boston, Massachusetts. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1994; Special Assistant to Governor Mario M. Cuomo, 1986-1991.1. Federal district Judge Jack Weinstein on Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. 91-CV-
3874, slip op. at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1991); see also Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/
91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27, 1991) (settled Jan. 1992).
2. Sam H. Verhovek, Cuomo is Sworn in For 3rd Term Without Festivities,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, at 31.
3. See David Margolick, The Making of a Chief Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1985, § 4 (Week in Review), at 6.
4. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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islative branches to fund the state court system at a judicially
mandated level of almost $1 billion.5
The doctrine of inherent powers is one which asserts that
the very existence of the courts implies their authority to exer-
cise powers reasonably necessary to the performance of judicial
functions. 6 Though the doctrine has been employed by Ameri-
can courts for various purposes since the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, Wachtler v. CuoMo7 was significant in several
ways. It marked the first substantial use of the doctrine by a
state's highest court against an equal branch of government. 8
The budget at the center of the conflict approached $1 billion,
dwarfing previous inherent power conflicts. 9 The lawsuit repre-
sented an unprecedented application of inherent powers to
lump-sum funding, as opposed to the discrete line-item expendi-
tures at issue in prior cases.' 0 Due to the involvement of New
York's Chief Judge and Governor, the case received wide media
coverage." The controversy focused public attention on consti-
tutional questions usually covered in the classroom or the court-
room rather than by the newsroom.' 2
Although the legal issues in Wachtler v. Cuomo never came
to trial, the lawsuit and the controversy it created are worth
analyzing for the lessons they provide about the nature and lim-
its of the inherent powers doctrine. It is particularly important
to consider the implications of Wachtler v. Cuomo at a time
when state court budgets around the country are tightly
squeezed by fiscal pressures, tempting besieged judges and
5. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
6. For a collection of definitions appearing in case law and commentary, see
JOHN C. CRATSLEY, INHERENT POWERS OF THE COURTS 19 (1980). For a discussion of
the conceptual basis of the doctrine, see infra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
7. No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County filed Sept. 27, 1991) (settled Jan.
1992).
8. See cases cited infra notes 14-26.
9. See cases cited infra notes 14-26.
10. See cases cited infra notes 14-26.
11. Chief Judge Wachtler resigned in November, 1992. Chief Judge Resigns
Court, N.Y. TimEs, Nov. 11, 1992, at B1.
12. See infra notes 90, 108, 124-25, 206-13 and accompanying text.
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court administrators into increased use of inherent powers to
address chronic budget shortfalls. 13
The objective of this Article is to assess the viability of ap-
plying the inherent powers doctrine in the context of a state
budget conflict. Centering on a case study of Wachtler v.
Cuomo, this Article will place this exercise of inherent powers
in historical perspective by analyzing the theoretical, preceden-
tial, doctrinal, and political implications of the use of the doc-
trine as a tool to compel funding for a state court system. Part
II discusses the historic roots and gradual expansion of the in-
herent powers doctrine. The judicially created doctrinal limita-
tions imposed on the use of the expanding doctrine are
introduced in Part III. Part IV presents a detailed review of the
political, legal and fiscal developments surrounding Judge
Wachtler's lawsuit. In Part V, Wachtler v. Cuomo is analyzed in
light of the legal, political, ,and conceptual justifications offered
for the exercise of inherent power. Part VI concludes that
although the doctrine of inherent powers may retain its vitality
as a tool to protect politically vulnerable local courts from local
government incursions into the judicial sphere of power, Wach-
tler v. Cuomo demonstrates that its expansion into the state-
wide budget process is untenable.
II. The Historical Expansion of the Inherent
Powers Doctrine
A. Early Uses of the Doctrine
The courts have long recognized the use of inherent powers
to assert judicial independence. The early applications of the
doctrine involved the courts' attempts to exercise control over
courthouse facilities and personnel, 14 and over the judicial pro-
13. See, e.g., John A. Clarke, Asserting the Courts' Independence, THE COURT
MANAGER, Winter 1992, at 9-12; Malcolm M. Lucas, Is Inadequate Funding Threat-
ening Our System of Justice?, 74 JUDicATURE 292 (1991).
14. See Scott v. Minnehaha County, 152 N.W. 699 (S.D. 1915) (preparation of
court calendars); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68 P. 689 (Nev. 1902) (court can
order new furniture and carpet); Board of Comm'rs v. Stout, 35 N.E. 683 (Ind.
1893) (control of courthouse elevator belongs to court); State ex rel. S. Howard v.
Smith, Auditor, 15 Mo. App. 412, 424 (1884) (power to appoint janitor); In re
Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (power to appoint janitor); Mc-
Calmont v. County of Allegheny, 29 Pa. 417 (1857) (ordering office space for court
clerk, ordering forms and stationery within inherent powers).
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cess itself, most notably through the power of contempt. 15 From
these limited beginnings, the use of the doctrine evolved to keep
pace with new developments and challenges affecting the man-
agement of the courts. During the 20th century, the courts
have frequently exercised the power to issue rules of practice
and procedure,' 6 rules governing the practice of law,17 rules of
courtroom decorum,' 8 protective orders against the press,' 9 pro-
visions for jury expenses, 20 and appointments of counsel for
criminal defendants.21 These exercises of inherent power were
largely limited to judicial housekeeping or to assert control over
adjudicative proceedings and administration, posing neither
threats to a coordinate branch nor any serious fiscal conse-
quences. 22 None of these applications of inherent power were
particularly objectionable on constitutional or political grounds.
15. See In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (1858). "The power to punish for con-
tempt is inherent in the nature and constitution of a court. It is a power not de-
rived from any statute but arising from necessity; implied, because it is necessary
to the existence of all the powers." Id. See also United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (dictum). In Hudson, the Court commented that "inherent
powers are those which cannot be dispensed with in a court because they are nec-
essary to the exercise of all others .... [O]ur courts no doubt possess powers not
immediately derived from statute .... " Id.
16. State v. Gary, 247 S.E.2d 420 (W. Va. 1978); Rose v. Palm Beach City, 361
So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1977); Albermont
Petroleum, Ltd. v. C.D. Cunningham, 9 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Ct. App. 1960); State ex rel.
Conway v. Superior Court,- 131 P.2d 983 (Ariz. 1942); Kolkman v. People, 300 P.
575 (1931); Walton v. Walton, 278 P. 780 (Colo. 1929).
17. Collins v. Godrey, 87 N.E.2d 838 (Mass. 1989); State Bar v. Guardian Ab-
stract Title Co., 575 P.2d 943 (N.M. 1978); In re Manoual, 247 S.E.2d 230 (N.C.
1977).
18. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
19. Rosato v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976); United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Younger v. Smith, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1973).
20. Rose v. Palm Beach City, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
21. Kovarik v. County of Banner, 224 N.W.2d 761 (Neb. 1975); People ex rel.
Conn v. Randolph, 219 N.E.2d 337 (Ill. 1966).
22. See, e.g., O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608, 611
(Mass. 1972) (Court's authority "is not limited to adjudication, but includes certain
ancillary functions, such as rulemaking and judicial administration, which are es-
sential if the courts are to carry out their constitutional mandate."); see also Geof-
frey Hazard, Jr. et al., Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286,
1288 (1972) ("Most of the reported decisions have involved marginal appropria-
tions for ancillary personnel and facilities rather than basic fiscal under-writing.").
114
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B. Modern Expansion of the Doctrine to Court Funding
During the last thirty years, the doctrine has been ex-
tended into areas of more significant fiscal consequence, and
the conflict between the branches has sharpened. The typical
modern dispute has involved the power of the courts to fill sup-
port positions and to compel the local legislature to fund them
at adequate salaries. 23 The rhetoric of the cases justified these
exercises of inherent power as necessary to preserve the inde-
pendence of the judicial branch. The judiciary, observed one
court, "is the only branch excluded from participation in the for-
mulation and adoption of the government budget. Such exclu-
sion makes the courts vulnerable to improper checks in the
form of reward or retaliation."24 Thus, the judiciary must "be
able to ensure its own survival when insufficient funds are pro-
vided by other branches."25
The application of the doctrine in these cases was not as
broad as its language suggests. The actual court orders com-
pelled funding for fairly small, discrete, line-item expenditures
such as salaries and equipment. 26 Notwithstanding the dicta,
the doctrine was not being used as a basic budget mechanism in
this line of cases. Furthermore, in virtually every reported case
since the 19th century the doctrine was being asserted by a
state court against a local government body. The interbranch
conflict was played out between a superior and inferior division
of government, and did not represent the confrontation between
equals as was implied by the expansive verbiage of the opinions.
23. See, e.g., Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 172
N.W.2d 436 (Mich. 1969) (power to set salaries of a group of probation officers and
law clerks), modified on reh'g, 190 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
923 (1972) (power to set salaries of a group of probation officers and law clerks);
Smith v. Miller, 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963) (judicial authority to set salaries of court
clerks); Noble County Council v. State, 125 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1955) (power to ap-
point probation officer).
24. In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 170 (Wash. 1976).
25. Id. at 171; see also Smith, 384 P.2d at 741 ("It is abhorrent to the princi-
ples of our legal system and to our form of government that courts, being a coordi-
nate department of government should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries
of an extrinsic will." (quoting conclusion of trial court)).
26. Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1976) ($125 per month increase in
salary for director of juvenile services); O'Coins, Inc. v. City of Worcester, 287
N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972) ($86 for tape recorder and tapes); State ex rel. Reynolds
v. County Court, 105 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. 1960) ($250 for an air conditioner).
1994] 115
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C. The Outer Bounds of the Doctrine: Commonwealth ex rel.
Carroll v. Tate
The furthest expansion of the doctrine occurred in Com-
monwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate.27 The dispute in Tate con-
cerned the 1970-71 budget request submitted by the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. The Mayor trimmed a
number of items from the $19.7 million request, reducing it to
$16.5 million, and the city council approved the reduced
amount.28 The court sought mandamus to compel the payment
of the additional funds.29 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in
affirming (with modifications) a lower court opinion ordering
restoration of approximately $2.5 million to the budget, argued
that fiscal autonomy was a requisite for judicial independence:
[T]he Judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine
and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable
and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its
powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a
co-equal, independent Branch of our Government.30
In determining whether the exercise of inherent power to com-
pel funding was justified, the court rejected consideration of the
fiscal condition of the locality as a factor.31
Tate was significant for two reasons. First, it marked an
expansion of the inherent powers doctrine into broader fiscal
matters than in previous cases. Substantial budget items for an
entire municipal court system were in dispute, rather than the
isolated expenditures of a particular judge, which had typified
prior inherent powers cases. Second, the traditional exercises
of inherent power served to protect the institutional control of
the court, but not at the expense of a coordinate branch.
Although some of the earlier cases required specific outlays, the
expenditure of a few dollars for a janitor or court stenographer
did not seriously impinge upon the institutional taxing or
27. 274 A.2d 193 (Pa.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
28. Id. at 195.
29. Id. at 193; see also Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine
and Demand Its Own Budget, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1187 (1972) for a discussion of the
case.
30. Carroll, 274 A.2d at 197.
31. Id. at 199.
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spending power of the legislative or executive branches.32 By
contrast, Tate's decision to allocate a significant amount of pub-
lic resources to the courts went to the heart of the city council's
institutional power. Thus, Tate marked the first "offensive" use
of inherent power; its exercise preserved the status of the courts
by diminishing the power of the legislature.
In spite of the distinctions, there were two fundamental
ways in which Tate was consistent with prior and subsequent
inherent powers case law which arguably made this "offensive"
use acceptable. First, as in virtually every other inherent pow-
ers case, the ultimate confrontation in Tate occurred not be-
tween coequal partners in state government, but between a
state supreme court and a local government unit.33 Tate and
the inherent powers case law should thus be viewed as a power
struggle between state and local government, rather than as a
true separation of powers conflict.3 4
Second, the offense in Tate, which spurred the use of inher-
ent powers, was that the legislature had eliminated specific ex-
penditure items from the court's budget. The gravamen of Tate
and its progeny was judicial resentment at being told how to
spend the courts' money, rather than discontent over how much
total spending was to be allocated.
III. Controlling the Expansion of Inherent Powers: Judicial
Limitations and the Growth of State Financing
In the wake of Tate, commentators predicted (with varying
degrees of approval) that courts, which had traditionally been
more of a spectator than a player, had found a tool by which
they could circumvent the budget process.35 At a time of in-
32. See Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1288, for a discussion of this point.
33. See cases cited supra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
34. See Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1288.
35. See Hazard et al., supra note 22; Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Com-
pel Legislative Funding of Judicial Functions, 81 MICH. L. Rxv. 1687 (1983); John
C. Taggart, Note, Judicial Power - The Inherent Power of the Courts to Compel
Funding for Their Own Needs - In Re Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d [sic] 232, 552
P.2d 163 (1976), 53 WASH. L. Rxv. 331 (1978); John F. Burke, The Inherent Power
of the Courts, 57 JUDICATURE 247 (1974); William S. Ferguson, Judicial Financial
Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972); James T. Brennan,
Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 277 (1971); Jim R. Carrigan, In-
herent Powers and Finance, 7 TRUAL 22 (NovJDec. 1971).
1994] 117
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creasing fiscal difficulties for municipalities around the country,
the use of inherent powers as a negotiating instrument or legal
weapon could prove to be a tempting way to address chronic,
broad-based budget problems. However, until Wachtler v.
Cuomo, inherent powers disputes actually remained confined to
discrete budget items rather than to broad budget-making; and
to state-local government conflicts rather than to primal clashes
between coequal branches at the state level.
There are several reasons why it took twenty years before
there was an attempt to expand the doctrine to the next level.
First, as the post-Tate case law developed and top-level court
administrators reacted to Tate, the courts placed a series of self-
imposed limitations on the exercise of inherent powers. 36 These
doctrinal limits include a requirement of prior approval, the
standard of reasonable necessity, the exhaustion of established
procedures, and, in some cases, appointment of an outside
judge.37 As state supreme courts recognized ever broader appli-
cations of the doctrine, they sought to impose these limits as a
means by which to regulate the exercise of inherent power by
the lower courts.38 Second, the development of unitary financ-
ing and lump-sum budgeting reduced the opportunities for in-
herent powers conflicts at the local level. 39
A. Judicially Imposed Doctrinal Limitations on Inherent
Powers
1. The Requirement of Prior Approval
An important limitation imposed on a court seeking to exer-
cise its inherent power is the prior approval of either a state
court administrator, or the supreme court itself, as a prerequi-
site to the exercise. Several states have embodied this require-
ment in an administrative order or court rule.40
36. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., MASS. SuP. JD. CT. R. 1:05 (requiring approval of chief judge);
MICH. SuP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER no. 1971-6, 386 Mich. xxix (1971) ("[N]o judge of a
subordinate court may ... order the expenditure of public funds for any judicially
required purpose until such judge has submitted his proposed writ or order to the
constitutional office of Court Administrator, and has obtained due approval .. ").
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Prior approval has two important consequences. First, it
gives the state supreme court ultimate control over the exercise
of inherent powers. Second, the approval requirement helps fa-
cilitate solutions between the court units and the local legisla-
tive units by placing the state court administrator in a position
to mediate the dispute outside of the judicial process. 41 Remov-
ing the dispute from the heated arena of local politics helps cool
the passions that might otherwise lead to an injudicious use of
the expanded doctrine.
2. The Reasonable and Necessary Standard
The second doctrinal requirement is that the funding
sought should be "reasonably necessary" to the functioning of
the court. 42 This vague, verbal formula is subject to manipula-
tion and is incapable of a precise definition.43 Despite its draw-
backs, this formula functioned as a minimum, uniform
guideline for budget development. Local judges and legislators
brought ad hoc standards and varying degrees of skill to the
budget making process; the decentralization of the budget pro-
cess simply did not lend itself to expert budget development. By
imposing the "reasonable and necessary" standard, the supreme
courts created a makeshift surrogate for the uniform standards
of a centralized finance system.44
A related purpose of the standard was to force the court
seeking to exercise inherent powers to document its needs in
order to add credibility to its action and reduce the chance that
41. See CRATSLEY, supra note 6, at 8 (citing CARL BARR, JUDICIAL AcTmvsM IN
STATE COURTS: THE INHERENT PowERs DOCTRINE).
42. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 199 (Pa. 1971), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (A court's "wants and needs must be proved by it to be
reasonably necessary for its proper functioning and administration.").
43. Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 241 N.W.2d 781,
782 (Minn. 1976) ("The test is not relative needs or judicial wants, but practical
necessity in performing judicial functions."); In re Salary of the Juvenile Director,
552 P.2d 163, 174 (Wash. 1976) (setting a strict standard of "clear, cogent, and
convincing proof' to show reasonable necessity).
44. It is clear from the inclusion in supreme court administrative rules of the
reasonable and necessary standard that the standard was aimed at imposing some
uniformity on local court budget activity. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
The concern over inconsistent local approaches to court budget policies has been
one of the driving forces behind court unification. See generally NATL INST. OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT, STRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF COURT
UNIFICATION REFORMS (1984).
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the exercise of inherent powers would be viewed as arbitrary.45
Although the cases rarely acknowledge that the exercise of in-
herent powers may implicate public trust in the judiciary, the
"reasonably necessary" requirement seems motivated in part by
such considerations. 46
3. The Requirement of Administrative Exhaustion
One of the most basic of the court-imposed limits is the re-
quirement that inherent powers may only be used when estab-
lished means for fulfilling a court's needs have failed. 47
Therefore, invoking inherent powers is an act of last resort.
Courts must, at a minimum, follow prescribed procedures for
legislative approval of budget items and cannot simply substi-
tute inherent powers for the normal legislative budget process.
4. Appointment of an Outside Judge
The appearance of judicial impartiality is threatened when
the judge who issues a funding order under the mantle of inher-
ent powers then reviews his own order in a subsequent legal
action. As a result, courts will sometimes require that a judge
who is unaffected by the inherent powers order hear the chal-
lenge to the order.48
B. The Growth of Modern Finance Mechanisms
Several nonjudicial developments have also affected the
use of inherent powers. First, with the advent of the modern
expansion of inherent powers that limited the budgetary discre-
tion of local governments, localities began to support state take-
45. See Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d at 174 (discussing the proper standard).
In that case, the court stated that "it is incumbent upon the courts, when they
must use their inherent power to compel funding, to do so in a manner which
clearly communicates and demonstrates to the public the grounds for the court's
action." Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Clerk of Court's Compensation v. Lyon County Comm'rs, 241
N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 1976) (inherent power could not be exercised to establish
clerk's salary where clerk failed to appeal figure set by county as required); Leahy
v. Farrell, 66 A.2d 577 (Pa. 1949) (inherent power not justified where lower court
failed to submit salary increase to county board as required by statute); Hillis v.
Sullivan, 137 P. 932 (Mont. 1913).
48. See, e.g., McCorkle v. Judges of Chatham County, 392 S.E.2d 707, 709
(Ga. 1990).
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overs of court financing. 49 As the use of unitary budgeting
expanded, the battleground for local, inherent powers disputes
contracted. 50 In addition, the introduction of lump-sum budget-
ing gave judges and court administrators greater flexibility in
creating and managing their budgets. Under lump-sum budget-
ing, there is no longer a need for a judge to go hat in hand to a
legislative body for a tape recorder 5' or an air-conditioner. 52
C. The Implications of Centralizing Financing and State
Supreme Court Control of the Doctrine: Setting the
Stage for Wachtler v. Cuomo
Taken together, the court-imposed limitations and the
budget innovations have largely removed inherent powers dis-
putes from the province of local government and have en-
couraged reconciliation of conflicts. As this process progressed,
some commentators predicted that inherent powers would be-
come less important as a budgeting tool for the courts. 53 A few
observers recognized that the removal of the budgeting process
to the state level and the assumption by the state's highest
courts of the role of guardian of the inherent power may have
raised the stakes of an inherent powers conflict even while re-
ducing the incidence of disputes."
49. See CRATSLEY, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing Carl Barr, Judicial Activism
in State Courts: The Inherent Powers Doctrine, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICY-
MAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 129 (Mary C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982)).
50. In New York State, for example, the 1962 consolidation of the court sys-
tem meant that the local courts were no longer dependent on the 62 county govern-
ments, thus reducing a significant number of potential fiscal flash points - or at
least shifting the battleground to the state level. See infra notes 54, 184 and ac-
companying text.
51. O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972).
52. State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court, 105 N.W.2d 876 (Wis. 1960).
53. See, e.g., Barr, supra note 49, at 146.
54. A group of prescient commentators who recognized the implications of
these events was Geoffrey Hazard and his co-authors, who wrote 20 years before
Wachtler v. Cuomo that:
a remote danger in unitary budgeting, but one which cannot be ignored, is
that the judicial system will take the inherent powers doctrine seriously and
try to secure its appropriation by mandamus. At this level the legislature
would find its vital interests and prerogatives threatened .... [T]he ulti-
mate outcome of such a conflict is impossible to predict but certainly it
would discredit both branches of government and embarrass judicial financ-
ing for some time.
Hazard et al., supra note 22, at 1300.
1211994]
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
Prior to Wachtler v. Cuomo, there were no significant inher-
ent power conflicts between coequal state branches of govern-
ment.55 As the fiscal problems of the cities during the 1960s
and 1970s (which spawned the modern expansion of the inher-
ent powers doctrine) became the burden of the states in the
1980s, the locus of inherent power conflicts shifted. With both
the budget process and control of inherent, powers residing at
the state level, an attempt to expand the doctrine beyond its
previous bounds in a direct confrontation between constitution-
ally equal branches of state government was inevitable.
IV. Wachtler v. Cuomo: A Chronicle of Constitutional Crisis
A. Judicial Funding and the New York Budget Process
The majority of states treat the judicial branch like any
other state agency in the preparation of the budget:56 judiciary
budget requests are submitted to executive budget officials who
review and revise the requests, and incorporate the revised re-
quests into the final budget submitted to the legislature. 57 The
remaining states either permit the judiciary to submit its
budget request directly to the legislature, or require the judici-
ary to submit its request to the executive branch, which must
then transmit the request to the legislature without revision
but subject to the recommendations of the executive. 58 New
York follows the latter procedure in which the executive acts as
a "conduit" for the judicial budget request; New York is fairly
unusual in that the conduit procedure is mandated by a consti-
55. There were several cases involving insignificant sums, none of which pre-
cipitated any head-to-head conflict between the branches over fundamental pow-
ers. See In re Appointment of Clerk of Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1957)
(power to appoint clerk); State ex rel. Cunningham, 101 P. 962 (Mont. 1909) (power
to set stenographer's salary); State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 68 P. 689, 690 (Nev.
1902) (power to order new furniture and carpet for supreme court); In re Janitor of
Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
In 1978, the West Virginia Legislature decreased funding for the judicial
budget several times. The Supreme Court of Appeals ordered the full budget rein-
stated. The case did not involve inherent powers; it turned on a constitutional
provision prohibiting the legislature from decreasing judicial budget items. State
ex rel. Bagley v. Blankenship, 246 S.E.2d 99 (W. Va. 1978).
56. CARL BARR, SEPARATE BUT SUBSERVIENT: COURT BUDGETING IN THE AMERI-
cAN STATES 25 (1975).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 29.
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tutional provision. 59 The constitution further provides that the
legislature may strike, reduce, or add items to the judiciary
budget request subject to the veto of the Governor.60
Pursuant to its constitutional powers, the New York State
Legislature had in fact consistently, reduced the judiciary re-
quest in each of the fiscal years from 1982-1990 by between $10
and $50 million, even while the actual level of appropriations
rose by over $400 million. 61 The Governor's acquiescence in
these reductions in the judiciary budget request became an in-
creasing source of tension between the Chief Judge and the
Governor to the point that observers looked to "their annual
squabble over the state judiciary budget" as a way to "enliven
Albany's dreary year end political scene."62
In 1982, the year Cuomo took office, the appropriation for
the judiciary was $480.1 million. This figure increased by $415
million or 86% during the following nine fiscal years.6 3 Yet, the
judiciary still found its resources stretched with these increases
falling an average of 4% short of its own budget requests.64
Since 1985, the year when "crack cocaine" first began to appear
in New York, the number of felony indictments and superior
court informations in Supreme and County Courts statewide in-
creased by 57%.65 Felony filings in the criminal terms of New
York County supreme courts increased by 73%.66 Municipal
59. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1 provides that:
Itemized estimates of the financial needs of the legislature, certified by the
presiding officer of each house, and of the judiciary, approved by the court of
appeals and certified by the chief judge of the court of appeals, shall be
transmitted to the Governor not later than the first day of December in each
year for inclusion in the budget without revision but with such recommen-
dations as he may deem proper. Copies of the itemized estimates of the fi-
nancial needs of the judiciary also shall forthwith be transmitted to the
appropriate committees of the legislature.
Id.
60. Id. § 4.
61. Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991 filed Sept.
27, 1991).
62. Elizabeth Kolbert, Cuomo at Odds with Top Judge on Budget Plea, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1989, at B3.
63. Wachtler, at 12.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 14.
66. Id.
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courts around the state were experiencing similar increases. 67
New York City Criminal Court calendars commonly contained
250 cases daily, as approximately 330,000 cases were filed in
1989.68 Noncriminal cases also surged during the late 1980s,
including a 223% increase in family court cases in New York
City, and civil filings increasing 25%.69 As caseloads rose
swiftly, judicial staffing resources increased only minimally,
and nonjudicial personnel remained understaffed, particularly
in the trial courts where 850 positions remained unfilled due to
budget constraints entering the 1991-92 fiscal year.70 The Chief
Judge had repeatedly pressed the legislature and the Governor
for more money over the years, characterizing court funding as
a "bones and sinew budget,"71 and privately complaining of cav-
alier treatment by the Governor.7 2 The resulting backlogs and
delays set the stage as the Office of Court Administration began
planning for the 1991-92 budget process in the fall of 1990.
B. The 1991-92 Executive Budget Proposal
On December 1, 1990, the Chief Judge transmitted to the
Governor and legislature a judiciary budget request for $966.4
million, an increase of $70 million, or 8% over the previous
year's appropriation.7 3 The Governor incorporated this request
in his Executive Budget without revision on January 31st7 4 and
included the entire request within the appropriations bill sub-
mitted to the legislature.7 5 However, in the Governor's finan-
cial plan, which contained the Governor's recommended levels
of expenditures and revenues, the Governor recommended a re-
duction of 10% from the judiciary's request, resulting in a $25
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 13.
71. William Glaberson, Cuomo Urged to Increase Court Budget, N.Y. TnMms,
Jan. 29, 1990, at B1.
72. Frank Lynn, Cuomo's Fiscal Battle With Judge Pits Dollars and Dignity,
N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 19, 1990, at B3.
73. Wachtler, at 7, 13.
74. 1991-92 N.Y.S. Executive Budget at 555-83.
75. S. 1751, A. 3051; Wachtler, at 12.
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million (2.8%) proposed reduction from the previous year's
appropriation. 76
The Governor's 2.8% proposed reduction in the judiciary
budget was in line with other spending cuts compelled by what
the Governor characterized as the state's worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression. 77 The 1991-92 Executive Budget
anticipated a $6 billion gap between revenue forecasts and
spending projections. 78 The $29.15 billion state spending plan
included proposals for the largest spending cuts and tax in-
creases in the state's history. 79 The cuts went to the heart of
some of the state's most powerful political constituencies. Gov-
ernor Cuomo acknowledged that the budget would generate "a
lot of complaining and a lot of screaming" from interest groups
but insisted that the state's basic strengths would remain in-
tact. 0 One of the first to respond was Chief Judge Wachtler,
who warned the Governor that "what you recommend will not
leave this state strong-it will leave it vulnerable in a very fun-
damental way."81
C. The Chief Judge Drops a Bombshell
Although the New York State Constitution imposes an
April 1 deadline for the approval of the state budget, the fiscal
crisis of the late 1980s complicated negotiations between the
Governor and legislature over spending cuts and revenue in-
creases, resulting in a series of missed budget deadlines.8 2 By
the time the April 1 deadline had passed in 1991, negotiators
still had not resolved major budget issues.
76. Wachtler, at 11. This distinction between the Executive Budget and finan-
cial plan would later form one focal point of the confrontation and intertwine with
the inherent powers arguments.
77. Sam H. Verhovek, Cuomo Proposing Steep Budget Cuts and Tax Increases,
N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 1, 1991, at Al.
78. Id.
79. Including a $1 billion cut in school aid, a 50% cut in aid to localities, the
abolishment of dozens of state agencies, the elimination of 18,000 state jobs (10%
of the work force), a $400 million loss in aid to New York City, and a host of new
taxes, including a 50% increase in tuition at state and city universities. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Sarah Lyall, Budget in Albany is Political Pact, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1993,
at B1.
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The question of the judiciary budget remained a back-
ground issue until mid-April when Chief Judge Wachtler, in a
Manhattan speech, dropped his first bombshell. Noting that
the Governor had failed to include the judiciary's own budget
estimate in his financial plan, the Chief Judge announced, "[a]s
far as I'm concerned, that's an unconstitutional budget."8 3 By
including a revised estimate in the financial plan, the Chief
Judge charged that the Governor was not just "fiddling with the
financial plan - he's fiddling with the Constitution."8 4 The
Chief Judge noted that several other court systems had success-
fully sued their states to force them to fully finance the judici-
ary,85 which was the first indication that he thought the
Governor's actions might come within the inherent powers
doctrine.
Off the record, judiciary officials were "hinting darkly"
about lawsuits.8 6 Governor Cuomo remained unperturbed by
the Chief Judge's remarks. "I have no doubts as to [the
budget's] constitutionality despite the Chief Judge's opinions,"
the Governor, who takes pride in his own legal acumen, told the
New York Times.87 Seizing on a theme that would recur
throughout the confrontation, the Governor tried to cast the
Chief Judge as the voice of just one more special interest group
vying for a bigger slice of a shrinking budget pie. "He's like all
the other people who speak in their political capacity. He's try-
ing to get as much as he can for his particular segment."88
The Chief Judge's approach was met with an equally cool
reception in the legislature, where the Chair of the Assembly
Judiciary Committee dismissed the constitutional accusations
as a "sort of 'how many angels can dance on the head of a pin'
kind of argument. The fact of the matter is the court system is
83. Elizabeth Kolbert, Wachtler Says Cuomo Cut Judiciary Funds Unconsti-
tutionally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1991, at B5.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. After graduating at the top of his St. John's law school class in 1956,
Cuomo clerked for the Court of Appeals for two years. Prior to embarking on a
career in politics, Cuomo developed a reputation as a tough litigator and creative
appellate attorney. See generally ROBERT S. McELvAiNE, MAmo CUOMO - A BiOG-
RAPHY, 133-46, 167-92 (1988).
88. Kolbert, supra note 83, at B5.
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not going to get the total budget they requested, and I think
they realize that."89
In the court of public opinion, the editorial writers awarded
round one of the budget battle to the Governor. 90 The New York
Times accused Wachtler of "picking a constitutional fight"
which "foment[ed] needless turmoil," and suggested that fears
of collapse in the justice system were "overstated," involving
consequences to public convenience, not safety.91 These re-
sponses did nothing to improve the Chief Judge's negotiating
position, and he was to suffer a more damaging loss in the next
round.
D. A Budget Is Approved
On May 31, 1991, the state legislature approved a final ap-
propriation for the judicial branch of $889.3 million.92 The
amount represented a decrease of $77 million from the judici-
ary's original budget request, and an increase over the Gover-
nor's recommendation by $19 million. Compared to the
previous year's appropriation, the judiciary absorbed an actual
decrease of about $6.5 million, or .7% of the 1990 budget.9 3 In
response, the Chief Judge again raised the possibility of an in-
herent powers lawsuit, suggesting that the "enormity" of the
cuts would justify legal action. "Courts throughout the country
have consistently held that the legislative and executive
branches have the obligation of adequately funding the
courts."94 Chief Judge Wachtler emphasized that an inherent
powers suit was "something that must be exercised with enor-
mous restraint. But we should not confuse judicial restraint
with judicial abdication."95
89. Id.
90. This Court Crisis Isn't Necessary, N.Y. TmEs, Apr. 15, 1991, at A16.
91. Id.
92. Wachtler, at 10.
93. The 1990-91 appropriation for the judiciary was $895.8 million. Wachtler,
at 12.
94. Gary Spencer, Legislature Appropriates $899 Million For Judiciary, N.Y.
L.J., June 4, 1991, at 1.
95. Id.
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E. The Legal and Political Battles
The situation remained quiet until September 1991 when
the Chief Judge made good on his threat and filed a lawsuit
against the Governor and legislative leaders in the New York
State Supreme Court. Chief Judge Wachtler charged that the
Governor had violated his constitutional obligation to incorpo-
rate the judiciary budget request in the Executive Budget, and
that the Governor and legislature had failed to fund the courts
adequately.9 6 He preceded the filing of the suit with an an-
nouncement that the budget would require 500 layoffs in the
court system and a cutback in the hours of operation of small
claims courts.
Chief Judge Wachtler accompanied these announcements
with a release of a letter to the Governor and the legislative
leaders complaining about the budget's treatment of the court
system.97 It appeared that the reaction to his April comments98
had convinced the Chief Judge that his constitutional argument
and inherent powers exercise would be met with skepticism un-
less he could win the hearts and minds of the public (and the
media) by pointing to the dramatic effects of the budget
shortfall. Thus, he ordered the cutbacks, and publicly released
the letter on September 5, 1991, announced the lawsuit on Sep-
tember 25, fired the 500 court workers the following day, and
filed the lawsuit the day after the layoffs, all of which was ac-
companied by press conferences and releases.99
The lawsuit took Albany observers by surprise. They had
viewed the Chief Judge's threats primarily as a bargaining tac-
tic designed to maximize his leverage during the spring budget
negotiations. 10 0 In fact, the Chief Judge may actually have been
looking ahead to the next budget cycle when he filed the law-
suit; in comments to reporters he conceded that he decided to
file the suit after receiving warnings from the Governor's
96. Wachtler, at 25-26.
97. Elizabeth Kolbert, Fiscal Cuts Forcing Layoffs, Chief Judge Says, N.Y.
TimEs, Sept. 6, 1991, at B3.
98. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
99. Sam H. Verhovek, Chief State Judge is Suing Cuomo to Get More Money
For Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at Al.
100. Id.
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budget office that the upcoming budget would contain no judici-
ary increase' 01
The Governor responded with a public relations offensive of
his own, returning to the themes that had worked earlier in the
year. 0 2 In a statement released on the day the lawsuit was
filed, Governor Cuomo again accused the judiciary of looking
out for its own interests while turning a blind eye to other needs
in the state. He made the point that the state's limited re-
sources meant that any increase for the courts would have to
come out of someone else's pocket: "[By] this complaint, the
judges of our State say that they are entitled to whatever they
feel they need for themselves and their courts, no matter whose
taxes go up; no matter what poor people, sick people or children
are denied; no matter who is laid off."10 3
The day after the suit was filed, Governor Cuomo and Chief
Judge Wachtler continued their "take no prisoners" brand of
public relations warfare. The Governor held a press conference
to sharply criticize the suit. He labeled it "zany," and said it set
a "dangerous precedent."10 4 He questioned the objectivity of
judges hearing a case in which their own interests were at
stake: "Having sat at the table of accusation, after they finish
making the charge, they jump up, leap on the bench, turn
around and say 'I was right.' Fascinating, even for New
York."105
Chief Judge Wachtler returned fire, charging the Governor
with a "total unfamiliarity with the law" and suggested that the
Governor should "spend more time governing, more time find-
ing ways to properly fund the courts, and spend less time hold-
ing press conferences." 10 6
The editorial writers were dismayed by the confrontation.
The New York Times ran an editorial captioned "Wachtler v.
Cuomo = Two Losers," and took both men to task for the level of
101. Id.
102. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103. Judge Wachtler Files his Suit to Get Courts More Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1991, at B3.
104. Kevin Sack, Cuomo Denounces Judge's Lawsuit on Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 28, 1991, at 22.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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bitterness marking the conflict. 10 7 On the merits of the issue,
the Times saw no change from its earlier conclusion that the
legal issues were beside the point; the real question was the "ju-
diciary's fair share" in a time of "plunging revenues and rising
needs" throughout the state. 08 The Times remained skeptical
that a few million dollars from a budget of $900 million would
make the difference between survival and collapse of the court
system. Picking up on a point that the Governor was emphasiz-
ing, the Times suggested that the suit raised "disturbing con-
flict of interest questions" for the courts. 10 9 Even if the Chief
Judge recused himself, should the case come before the Court of
Appeals, "how could any other New York judge credibly try a
case whose outcome would determine resources available for his
own courtroom?" 10 None of the commentary in the major pa-
pers gave any serious recognition to the inherent powers doc-
trine or precedent.
While the two men continued to lob daily volleys in the pub-
lic relations battle, the Governor opened up a second front in
the legal conflict with a countersuit filed before Federal Judge
Jack Weinstein in the Eastern District of New York."' The
Governor sought dismissal of the state court suit, relying on
Civil War era civil rights provisions to argue that voters would
be disenfranchised if their elected officials' budget making deci-
sions could be overridden by unelected judges. 1 2 The complaint
also repeated the Governor's public argument that the state
courts could not fairly decide a case in which they had a strong
institutional interest. 1 3
Judge Weinstein declined to dismiss the suit, but suggested
in a written opinion that the courtroom was not the best place
107. Wachtler v. Cuomo = Two Losers, N.Y. TMEs, Sept. 27, 1991, at A28.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Kevin Sack, Cuomo Challenges His Chief Judge's Lawsuit, N.Y. TmEs,
Oct. 8, 1991, at B1.
112. Gary Spencer, New Cuts Sought from Court Budget, Cuomo Cites Need to
Close Latest Deficit, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1991, at 2. The theory of Cuomo's suit was
that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1443, Wachtler's suit had the effect of denying New
Yorkers their vote for legislators who had adopted the budget and that the Wach-
tier suit violated the Equal Protection Clause by elevating judicial desires "over
the demands of all other people of the state." Id.
113. Sack, supra note 104, at 22.
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to resolve the budget dispute. He admonished the two "titans of
New York" to avoid "an unseemly conflict" by negotiating a res-
olution.114 "Is it not time now, at the threshold, to stop, to rea-
son, to withdraw from what will become a public spectacle with
no benefit to the people whom both the talented Governor and
the learned Chief Judge so desperately want to serve?,"115 ques-
tioned Weinstein. "We are faced with the paradox that litiga-
tion designed to solve a problem makes its solution less
likely.""l6
To help achieve an out-of-court resolution, Weinstein asked
former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to mediate the dis-
pute. 117 Vance found negotiating this conflict to be as frustrat-
ing as his efforts to bring peace to the Balkans, l l8 for as soon as
court recessed, the war of words began anew. The Governor
tried to "remind the world that ["the unseemly conflict"]119 was
started by the Chief Judge":
It was the judges who charged into court, using their power and
their forum as a giant sledgehammer to demand from the rest of
the society that they be accommodated above all other people as
though they weren't just judges, they were some kind of
Brahmains [sic] who were specially selected. 120
After being told by a reporter of the Governor's comments,
the Chief Judge reportedly reacted with an obscenity before re-
sponding that the "conflict was started when [the Governor]
submitted our budget in an unconstitutional fashion, causing
the closing of our courts."121 The Chief Judge dismissed the
Governor's comments as "populist rhetoric" and announced that
he would accept the mediation effort.122 However, the Governor
rejected Vance's mediation effort, suggesting that neither the
114. Cuomo v. Wachtler, No. 91-CV-3874, slip op. at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 1991).
115. Id. at 4.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See David Binder, Vance, Leaving Sees Hope for Bosnia Plan Despite
Fighting, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1993, at A8.
119. Sack, supra note 111, at B1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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constitution nor the state's fiscal condition were amenable to
negotiation.123
The Weinstein comments provided fresh ammunition for
the editorial writers who caricatured the Governor and the
Chief Judge as "schoolyard gladiators," and repeated the con-
tention that "this dispute simply doesn't belong in court."124
The Times dismissed the legal arguments and insisted again
that "the dispute remains more political than legal." 25
As work on the legal briefs continued in October 1991 (with
the Governor telling reporters he was up late every night re-
searching the law for his countersuit1 26 the out-of-court maneu-
vering intensified, with both sides threatening investigations of
the other's spending practices. By the end of October, it ap-
peared that the Chief Judge was wavering in his resolve to con-
tinue the lawsuit. 27 He reportedly was willing to accept as
little as $11 million in increased funding along with a "pledge"
that the courts may directly submit their budget request to the
legislature. 28 However, he stood firm on the principle driving
the suit, contending that even if he lost the lawsuit, "I would
have made the point that we are not another state agency - we
are a separate and co-equal branch of government." 129
F. New York's Fiscal Picture Darkens
In November 1991, the pressure on the Chief Judge to
agree to a settlement increased sharply when state budget offi-
cials announced their estimate of a mid-year budget gap of
nearly $700 million. 30 The Governor moved to drop his federal
countersuit and to abandon his effort to remove the primary
suit to federal court, citing the need for expedited discovery of
judicial spending in the state case in order to propose additional
cuts in the current year and in the spending plan for the 1992-
123. Id.
124. A Hot Feud, Through Cooler Eyes, N.Y. TmEs Oct. 9, 1991, at A24.
125. Id.
126. Sam H. Verhovek, Wachtler v. Cuomo: Duel of Ex-Friends, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1991, at B1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Sarah Bartlett, Fathoming the Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, § 1, at 1.
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93 budget.131 The Governor undoubtedly calculated that open-
ing the judiciary's books to public scrutiny would be a more po-
tent weapon to force dismissal than the federal countersuit.
Judiciary officials attempted to turn the strategy around by
suggesting that they were equally eager to begin discovery of
spending in the Governor's office. 132 By late November 1991,
however, the Governor's budget office announced that the mid-
year budget gap had risen to $875 million.133 Governor Cuomo
ordered additional deep cuts throughout state government in-
cluding a further cut of $26 million in the current-year budget
for the judiciary. 134
The Chief Judge responded by announcing that the addi-
tional cuts would force the closing of all civil courts and half of
the state's criminal courts by January 1, 1992.135 The rhetoric
reached a fever pitch. In a statement, Chief Judge Wachtler
predicted that "the closing of so many criminal courts would
lead unavoidably to the release of hundreds, even thousands, of
criminal defendants because of jail overcrowding and speedy
trial mandates."136 The Chief Judge went on to accuse the gov-
ernor of "vindictiveness" because of the lawsuit.137 The Gover-
nor's press secretary responded that it was "absurd" to suggest
that a 3.4% cut would cause the closure of most of the state's
courts: "Perhaps there's new management needed in the courts
if they can't manage a 3% cut."138
Two days later the Office of Court Administration released
its budget request for the upcoming fiscal year. The request
proposed a $61 million increase over current (1991-92) court
funding, which was enough to restore most of the previous cuts
including the lay-offs and add sixteen judges. 139 The request
was significant because it actually sought less money for the
131. Gary Spencer, Cuomo Drops Effort to Shift Funding Suit, Wachtler Chal-
lenge to Return to State Court, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 1991, at 1.
132. Id.
133. Wachtler Says New Budget Cuts May Lead to Release of Suspects, N.Y.
TiMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at B4.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Kevin Sack, Court Propose New Fees to Pay for A Budget Rise, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1991, at 25.
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next fiscal year (1992-93) than the Chief Judge was seeking for
the current (1991-92) fiscal year through the lawsuit. In a de-
parture from previous years, the budget request presented the
legislature with a variety of cost-saving and fee options to pay
for the increase. The proposals included a 1% levy on civil judg-
ments and a fifty dollar fee for filing motions. 140
Representatives of the legal community, usually staunch
opponents of such proposals, reflected the depth of concern over
the current budget gridlock by acknowledging that the fees
might be necessary to get the courts moving again.'4 ' The new
budget request thus seemed to represent a tacit acknowledge-
ment that the legal and political battle over the 1991-92 budget
was draining the court's institutional effectiveness and damag-
ing its credibility, and was a harbinger of the settlement to
come.
The judiciary's reputation suffered one more blow when
Chief Judge Wachtler, in a December 13, 1991 letter to the
state's judges, told them that he intended to seek pay increases
for the 1,100 state judges despite the budget cuts and layoffs. 142
This split the court's own constituency when the politically pow-
erful Court Officers' Association denounced the move. 43
Although the letter seemed to be nothing more than a morale
booster for the judges, because it made no mention of when the
Chief Judge would seek the increase, the Governor's spokesper-
son was quick to pounce on the misstep. "His startling request
for raises for judges at this time of hardship for the hardwork-
ing people of the middle class, and those in poverty, does more
to impair his credibility than we ever could."'" On the legal
front, the Governor chose to file his motion to dismiss Chief
Judge Wachtler's lawsuit arguing that the New York State Con-
stitution precluded the use of inherent powers to compel a state
judicial budget. 145
140. Id.
141. Id. The representatives included the New York State Bar Association. Id.
142. Robert D. McFadden, Wachtler in Letter Vows to Seek Raises for Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1991, at B5.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Motion to Dismiss, Wachtler v. Cuomo, No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County filed Dec. 24, 1991).
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G. Settlement
With the 1992-93 budget release just weeks away, intense
negotiations over the 1992-93 judiciary budget were being
brokered by legislative staff. The Governor was prepared to
propose significant new cuts in the judiciary spending plan for
the new year.146 The combination of pressures created by
budget realities, the upcoming hearing on the motion to dis-
miss, and the constant battering in the press finally moved the
Chief Judge to cut both his fiscal and public relation losses end-
ing the year-long conflict.
At 4:30 p.m. on January 16, 1992, the Chief Judge called
the Governor with an offer to resolve the crisis.147 The Chief
Judge proposed that if the Governor would agree to restore the
judiciary budget for the upcoming fiscal year to the expenditure
level of the previous fiscal year, he would drop the suit and open
his books to an outside auditor. 48 An hour later, the Governor
called back and told the Chief Judge, "It's done." 49 A year of
political and legal skirmishes came to an end just days prior to
the first arguments on the merits of the case and the release of
the 1992-93 budget plan. 50
V. Analysis of Wachtler v. Cuomo
Wachtler v. Cuomo broke new ground in the development of
the inherent powers doctrine. The suit represents the only at-
tempt to date to test the doctrine's viability in a direct confron-
tation between coequal branches of state government over the
lump-sum budget of a state judiciary. To evaluate the efficacy
of this or similar attempts, this section will address the theoret-
ical, doctrinal, precedential and political implications of Wach-
tler v. Cuomo.
146. The proposed cuts were in excess of $130 million. Gary Spencer, Wach-
ter, Cuomo Settle Funding Suit, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 17, 1992, at 2.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1.
149. Id. at 2.
150. For an evaluation of the settlement, see infra notes 187-92 and accompa-
nying text.
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A. Wachtler v. Cuomo and the Theoretical Justification for
Inherent Power
The doctrine of inherent powers holds that a branch of gov-
ernment may exercise the power necessary to protect itself in
the performance of its institutional duties. 151 The source of the
power is said to be neither constitutional nor statutory; it is an
intrinsic characteristic of the institution.152 The doctrine finds
its primary theoretical basis in the separation of powers. The
functional differentiation between the branches of government
is designed, in Madison's words, to prevent "the accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands," for this concentration would be "the very definition of
tyranny." 53 This separation is enforced by the concept of
checks and balances which provides "great security against a
gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
ment [by] giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others."M By permitting one branch to
"resist encroachments" by the other branches, the inherent
powers doctrine serves as a balancing mechanism of the consti-
tutional framework.
The paradox of the inherent powers doctrine is that the
very exercise of inherent power by a branch of government vio-
lates the separation of powers in order to preserve the branch's
status as an equal and independent unit of government. 55
When, for example, a court compels funding for the salary of a
clerk or legal secretary, it is exercising the appropriation power
which belongs to the legislative branch. This violation is not
151. See Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); see generally CRATsLEY & CARRIGAN, supra note
6, at 18, and cases therein.
152. See, e.g., In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 275 N.W. 265,
267 (Neb. 1937) ("The term 'inherent power of the judiciary' means that [power]
which is essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the court from the very
fact that it is a court."); In re Surcharge of County Comm'rs, 12 Pa. D. & C. 471,
477 (Lackawanna County Comm. PI 1928). In this case, the court held: "Such pow-
ers from both their nature and their ancient exercise, must be regarded as inher-
ent. They do not depend upon express constitutional grant nor in any sense upon
legislative will.' Id.
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
154. THE FEDERALmsT No. 51 (James Madison).
155. See Ferguson, supra note 35, at 986-87 for a discussion of this point.
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troublesome for several reasons. First, it has been recognized
since Madison's time that the separation of powers is not a rigid
demarcation, but one which tends to blur at the edges. The
branches of government are not meant to be "wholly uncon-
nected with each other."15 6 The branches should be "connected
and blended as to give each a constitutional control over the
other."157 There is no fundamental objection where the exercise
by one branch of another branch's powers helps to protect the
constitutional status of each. This is the essence of checks and
balances.
Second, this kind of action, while protecting the judicial ca-
pacity to carry out institutional functions, does not strike at the
power of a coordinate branch in any vital way. Simply because
the judiciary's power is augmented does not mean that the legis-
lature's power is correspondingly diminished. Where the exer-
cise of the power is by a superior governmental unit, as in the
typical case in which a state supreme court compels funding
from a locality, the concern over a separation of powers viola-
tion by the judiciary is remote. The concern underlying the con-
cept of separation of powers is concentration of power in one
source. This concern is simply not implicated in any real way
when a court exercises its inherent power to protect itself with-
out diminishing the sphere of a coordinate and equal branch.
Conversely, the point at which the exercise of the power can
no longer be characterized as an action which merely protects
one branch but instead diminishes the rights and powers of a
coordinate and equal branch marks the conceptual boundary of
inherent power. It is at this point where the judiciary ceases to
act as a check on the other branches and begins to encroach on
their dominion. When the exercise of inherent powers crosses
this line it becomes a cure that does more damage to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine than the malady it was intended to
address.
Wachtler v. Cuomo is on the wrong side of this line. The
power to tax and the power to appropriate are vested in the leg-
islature.158 Financial support for the courts can only come from
156. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison).
157. Id.
158. Though the wording and provisions of state constitutions differ, all state
legislatures possess these powers, subject only to constitutional limitations such as
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tax revenues in the form of an allocation of appropriations. 159
When a state court compels a state legislature to fund the judi-
ciary at a level beyond that which the legislature has deter-
mined can be supported by the fisc, the court, in essence, is
mandating either an exercise of the taxing power or a realloca-
tion of appropriations, or both. This exercise of inherent power
would redress the injury to the judiciary only by upsetting the
fundamental alignment of the branches, and thus is neither an
acceptable nor legitimate use of the inherent powers doctrine.
Chief Judge Wachtler's attempt to compel $77 million in addi-
tional funding from an already balanced budget usurped core
taxing and appropriation powers of the legislature. The suit
thus cannot be justified as an exercise of inherent power be-
cause it would do far more to damage than to preserve the sepa-
ration of powers. 160
B. Wachtler v. Cuomo and the Doctrinal Limitations on
Inherent Power
1. The Requirement of Prior Approval
Courts have developed a number of doctrinal limitations on
the exercise of inherent power even as they have broadened its
scope. 16 The most important of these is the requirement that a
lower court receive the prior approval of the state supreme
court or central court administrator for any inherent power ex-
ercise. 16 2 The review process results in a more objective evalua-
tion of the proposed action when the decision to invoke inherent
powers is removed from the local judge, who stands to gain the
executive veto. For the provisions of specific constitutions, see generally LEGISLA-
TIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND OF COLUMBIA UNivERsrry, CoNsTITUTONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE (1983).
159. See id.
160. Some of the cases are beginning to explicitly recognize this danger. See
McCorkle v. Judges of the Superior Court, 392 S.E.2d 707, 708 (Ga. 1990). Inher-
ent power:
does not give the judicial branch the right to invade the province of another
branch of government. As a principle flowing from the separation of powers
doctrine, it arms the judicial branch with authority to prevent another
branch from invading the province. The inherent power is not a sword but a
shield."
Id.
161. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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most from the exercise, and from the arena of local politics.
This tends to screen out injudicious use of the power and to en-
courage conciliation between the local parties. These con-
straints are lost when the supreme court itself chooses to
exercise its inherent power. There is no disinterested entity to
review the high court's decision. Without this escape valve the
decision is mired in the highly charged context of an inter-
branch budget battle, an environment unlikely to produce an
objective evaluation of the exercise of inherent power.163 Thus,
in a situation like Wachtler v. Cuomo where the state's highest
court is involved in a significant inter-branch conflict, the most
important of the safeguards imposed by the state's highest
courts to control the use of inherent power is rendered meaning-
less. This is exacerbated in a state like New York where inher-
ent powers precedent is sparse, 164 and which has no guidelines
or court rules to regulate the initiation of inherent power suits.
2. The Reasonable and Necessary Standard
The second doctrinal limitation that has emerged in the
case law is the requirement that the funding sought by the exer-
cise of inherent power is "reasonable and necessary" for the
functioning of the court. 165 This somewhat murky standard has
been used to evaluate whether specific line-item expenditures
are important enough to compel their funding. It responds to
the problem of local judges who make their own budgets with-
out the oversight or expertise of professional budget experts,
sometimes resulting in questionable budget requests. 166 The
standard served, in effect, as surrogate for professional budget-
ing guidelines. It was not designed for and has never been ap-
163. The political stakes in an inter-branch conflict at the constitutional level
can be extraordinarily high. In New York, during the time of the lawsuit, it was
widely assumed that the Chief Judge was preparing to run for Governor against
Mario Cuomo and that Chief Judge Wachtler's assertiveness on the budget may
have been motivated by his political ambitions. See Sam H. Verhovek, Friends of
Judge: GOP Answer to Cuomo, N.Y. TuMEs, Nov. 8, 1992, at 48; Lynn, supra note
72, at B3. This suggests that the inherent powers doctrine can be as subject to
abuse as a political weapon on the state level as on the local level.
164. See infra notes 176-180 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
166. See Schmelzel v. Board of County Comm'rs, 100 P. 106 (Idaho 1909)
(haircuts and shaves for jurors not considered necessary for functioning of judicial
process.)
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plied to a lump-sum appropriation request developed by court
administration experts through a rigorous budget process. Pre-
sumably, modern court administrators in a unified system
would not submit any request which was not demonstrably rea-
sonable and necessary according to established fiscal standards.
The court request developed in the modem budget process is, by
definition, reasonable and necessary or the court would not
have made the request.
The reasonable and necessary standard is thus no help as a
device to screen out improper uses of inherent powers. At the
level of sophisticated statewide budgeting it has the opposite ef-
fect of turning every budget request into one which would pro-
vide grounds for an exercise of inherent power. Where, as in
New York, the state constitution explicitly recognizes the legis-
lature's right to reduce the judiciary's budget,167 conflict is al-
most guaranteed by the use of the "reasonable and necessary"
standard. If a lump-sum budget request by the state judiciary
can always be defended as reasonable and necessary and the
legislature exercises its constitutional power to reduce that re-
quest, then the use of inherent powers is always justified. What
began as a standard designed to limit the use of inherent pow-
ers becomes, under the Wachtler v. Cuomo scenario, a device
which encourages separation of powers conflicts.
3. The Requirement of Administrative Exhaustion
The third limitation imposed by case law is that the estab-
lished means of seeking funding must be utilized before a court
can exercise its inherent power.168 This fundamental constraint
is designed to ensure that courts do not substitute inherent
powers for statutory procedures. However, as with the other
restrictions, it has little bite at the state level where the budget
process is statutorily or constitutionally mandated. If the es-
tablished budgetary procedures that fail to produce the desired
funding are constitutionally mandated, as in New York, 6 9 then
the exercise of inherent power not only presents a clash with a
coordinate and coequal branch over the force of a statute, but
167. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
168. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
169. BARR, supra note 56, at 26-27.
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also creates significant tension with the constitution itself.170
Since the ultimate goal of the inherent powers doctrine is to re-
dress imbalances in the framework of separation of powers, a
use of the doctrine which engenders constitutional discord un-
dermines the purpose of inherent powers.
4. Appointment of an Outside Judge
A fourth and final device is utilized by state supreme courts
to regulate inherent powers cases. Although not a formal part
of the doctrine, it has been the practice of state supreme courts
to appoint a judge from outside the local judicial district where
the dispute arose to hear the case at the trial level.171 Like the
prior approval mechanism, this practice brings a disinterested
decision-maker into the dispute providing a more objective re-
view of the case and increasing public confidence in the process.
These constraints are sacrificed in a state budget conflict. The
specter of a judge hearing a case in which he or she has a direct
interest in the result is not easily masked when every judge in
the court system has a stake in the outcome of an inherent pow-
ers conflict over global funding for the judiciary. 72 Further-
more, it is entirely likely that the case will wind its way up to
the state's high court - the same court whose Chief Judge has
brought the case. The difficulties with the real or apparent con-
flicts of interest point up the unsuitability of utilizing inherent
power as a judicial financing tool at the state level, as Wachtler
v. Cuomo attempted to do.
C. Wachtler v. Cuomo and Inherent Powers Precedent
1. The National Case Law
Wachtler v. Cuomo marks a departure from inherent pow-
ers precedent in a number of ways. Most significantly, it was
the first serious inherent powers challenge between coequal
170. See supra notes 59-60; see infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also Ferguson, supra note
35, at 564 n.16 and Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court Fund-
ing, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. Rxv. 217, 231, nn.86-96 (1993) for a
discussion and cases on the impartiality problem in judicial review of funding
orders.
172. See Governor Cuomo's comments, supra note 105 and accompanying
text; editorial comments, supra note 110 and accompanying text; and general dis-
cussion of public confidence, infra notes 193-215 and accompanying text.
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branches of state government as opposed to the state-local con-
flicts that have characterized the cases thus far.173 Addition-
ally, it is the first case to assert an inherent power to overturn a
lump-sum budget rather than specific expenditures. 7 4 Finally,
the magnitude of the budget at issue - approaching $1 billion
- sets Wachtler v. Cuomo apart from previous exercises of in-
herent power, which tended to be limited to small expendi-
tures.175 Thus, although the dicta of inherent powers cases is
sweeping, the holdings have in fact been quite narrow and do
not provide firm support for expansion of the doctrine to conflict
on the level of Wachtler v. Cuomo.
2. The New York Case Law on Inherent Power
The history of the use of inherent powers in New York is
less developed than in many jurisdictions. No major inherent
powers case has come out of New York; the majority of the in-
herent powers cases in New York involve court control of the
adjudicatory process. 76 The few New York cases involving the
power to compel funding are limited in their reach. The strong-
est case is In re McCoy v. Mayor of the City of New York 177 In
McCoy, the city of New York refused to provide any funding for
a newly created housing part of the civil court. The local court
administrators sued the city to compel funding. The court held
that the city had to provide the requested funds.178 However,
the holding appeared to rest on the fact that the state legisla-
ture had authorized the creation of the housing part and that
the city by refusing to fund it was "flout[ing] a legislative man-
date."179 There was no significant discussion of inherent powers
173. See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
174. See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
175. See cases cited supra notes 14-26; see supra notes 27-55.
176. See, e.g., In re Bar Ass'n of N.Y., 222 A.D. 580, 227 N.Y.S. 1 (1st Dep't
1928) (power to conduct investigation); Benjamin Franklin Fed. Say. Ass'n v. PJT
Enters., Inc., 149 Misc. 2d 688, 566 N.Y.S.2d 478 (Sup. Ct. Cortland County 1991)
(power to punish for contempt); Bankers Trust Co. v. Braten, 101 Misc. 2d 227, 420
N.Y.S.2d 584 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1979) (power to assign cases); People v. Bell,
95 Misc. 2d 360, 407 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Crim. Ct. Queens County 1978) (power to con-
trol calendar).
177. 73 Misc. 2d 508, 347 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), modified and
affd, 41 A-D.2d 929, 344 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1st Dep't 1973).
178. Id. at 513, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
179. Id. at 510, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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doctrine in this or any other New York case, thus leaving the
status of the doctrine uncertain at best. 180
3. Inherent Powers and the New York Constitution
In addition to the indefinite recognition of inherent powers
in New York case law, the New York Constitution implicitly re-
jects the use of judicial inherent power to compel funding when
the funding is the result of constitutional procedure:
Insofar as the expense of the courts is borne by the state or paid
by the state in the first instance, the final determination of the
itemized estimates of the annual financial needs of the courts
shall be made by the legislature and the governor [in accordance
with the prescribed procedures]., 8l
Taken in concert with the procedures that permit the legis-
lature to alter the judiciary budget18 2 and the Governor to veto
that budget in whole or in part, 8 3 the constitution explicitly
contemplates reduction of the state judiciary budget without ju-
dicial recourse.'i 4 A line of New York cases subsequent to the
reorganization of the courts under these provisions recognizes
that the existence of explicitly governing statutory or constitu-
tional provisions preempts judicial intervention in matters in-
volving the appropriation power. 18 Thus, it is not clear whether
180. A comprehensive review of the development and status of inherent pow-
ers doctrine in New York is beyond the scope of this paper. There is extraordina-
rily little attention in either the cases or the commentary to inherent powers in
New York. The topic is ripe for further research. The only point sought to be made
here is that the doctrine is simply not well established in New York.
181. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 29 (emphasis added). In addition, article VII, § 7
provides that "[n]o money shall ever be paid out of the state treasury... except in
pursuance of an appropriation by law .... " N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 7. For a de-
tailed description of constitutional procedures, see infra notes 59-60 and accompa-
nying text.
182. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
183. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
184. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. Nos. 36, 24 (1958). The Temporary Commission on
the Courts, which drafted article VI, said of § 29 that "all budget requests are as
the name implies requests and will be finally determined by the appropriating
agencies as, in their wisdom, they deem right. No court is to continue to have
mandate power over its own budget" (emphasis in original). See also JOINT LEGIS.
COMM'N ON COURT REORG., Ninth Interim Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 46 at 17-18
(1964) ("paramount" authority over the Judiciary's budget rests with the Governor
and legislature).
185. See Cohn v. Borchard Affil., 25 N.Y.2d 237, 252, 250 N.E.2d 690, 697, 303
N.Y.S.2d 633, 643 (1969) (holding that a statute did not infringe on the judiciary's
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New York constitutional law or case law supports the use of in-
herent power as asserted in Wachtler v. Cuomo.l s6
D. A Political Evaluation of Wachtler v. Cuomo
The weakness of the theoretical justifications for Wachtler
v. Cuomo and the paucity of New York law on the issue of inher-
ent powers suggest that the suit may primarily have been a
political tool to leverage additional funding in future budget ne-
gotiations. It is not clear that the suit was successful even on
these terms. Furthermore, to the extent that the handling of the
suit undermined public confidence in the judiciary and injured
the judiciary's relationships with the other branches the dam-
age resulting from Wachtler v. Cuomo may have outweighed
any potential gains.
1. The Settlement and the Fiscal Outcome for the Courts
The stated objectives of the suit were to alter the way in
which the Governor submitted the judiciary's budget to the leg-
inherent power to control calendars). In Cohn the court stated: "It is one thing to
be of the view that the power... should be in the Court. It is quite another to say
that it is there in the face of clear evidence that the Constitution chose not to lodge
it there." Id. (quoting David Siegel, Supplementary Practice Commentary, N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R., Book 7B at 307-08 (McKinney 1968); see also County of Oneida
v. Berle, 49 N.Y.2d 515, 522, 404 N.E.2d 133, 137, 427 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (1980)
("In budgetary matters, the essential process is detailed by the Constitution, and
the role of each branch distinctly treated."); Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 549,
378 N.E.2d 95, 97-98, 406 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1978). In referring to article VI, the
court in Saxton stated that "[t]he power of the judiciary is as subject to such limita-
tions as is that of its coordinate branches of government, for the specter of judicial
tyranny is no more palatable to a free people than is the threat of an uncontrolled
executive or legislative branch .... Under our system of government, the creation
and enactment of the state budget is a matter delegated essentially to the Gover-
nor and the Legislature." Id; see also People v. Ohrenstien, 77 N.Y.2d 38, 46, 565
N.E.2d 493, 496, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (1990) ("Under the State Constitution, the
Legislature alone has the power to authorize expenditures from the State treasury
.... "); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 438, 441-42, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56, 58, 369
N.Y.S.2d 87, 91, 94 (1975). In Smiley the court stated: "Nor under the State Con-
stitution may the courts of this state arrogate the power to appropriate and pro-
vide funds .... The absence of appropriated funds and legislation to raise taxes
under our state constitutional system.., is not a judicially fillable gap." Id.
186. Unsurprisingly, the legal memoranda of the Chief Judge rely heavily on
cases from other jurisdictions. See Plaintiff's Mem. of Law in Opposition to De-
fendant's Motions to Dismiss at 10-14, Wachtler v. Cuomo No. 6034/91 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County filed Sept. 27, 1991) (citing 14 non-New York inherent power cases,
and just four New York inherent power funding cases).
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islature, and to compel an additional $77 million in funding for
the judiciary.18 7 Neither goal was achieved by the settlement
proposed and agreed to by the Chief Judge. The Governor did
not change the way in which the budget was submitted. Fur-
thermore, the courts did not receive the additional funding they
sought to compel, and, in fact, received a substantial further cut
in funding due to the mid-1991 budget deficit.' 88
The courts did receive a small increase for the 1992-93 fis-
cal year, but only enough to restore the budget to the 1990
level. 18 9 This amount was still $55 million less than the Office
of Court Administration had estimated it would need for the
1992-93 fiscal year. 190 In addition, the court system would now
be subject to an outside audit, a move the Chief Judge had re-
sisted.' 91 Although judicial officials sought to put the best face
on the settlement, 92 the reality was that the courts ended 1991
worse off than they started and would be no better off in the
next budget year.
2. The Effect of Wachtler v. Cuomo on Public Confidence
in the Courts
a. Publicizing the Plight of the Courts
From the commencement of Wachtler v. Cuomo it was clear
that the Chief Judge was making his case on behalf of the
courts not only in a legal setting, but to the public at large. 193
Even the complaint read much like a press release, detailing
the alleged mistreatment of the courts at the hands of the legis-
lature and the Governor, recounting "the ever-increasing work-
load of the Judicial Branch" and describing its effects on the
administration of justice. 94 Articles by court officials and
prominent New York lawyers appeared in the legal press echo-
ing the message and explaining why the use of inherent powers
187. Wachtler, at 12, 25-26.
188. Spencer, supra note 146, at 2.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
191. Spencer, supra note 146, at 2.
192. Id.
193. See supra notes 94-95, 136 and accompanying text.
194. Wachtler, at 24.
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was an appropriate legal exercise.195 The major papers ran fea-
tures on the deteriorating conditions of the courts as part of
their overall coverage of the dispute. 196 The lawsuit presented
the Chief Judge with an unparalleled opportunity to place the
plight of the courts in the public eye, in the hopes of building
support for enhancement of the judicial budget.
Although Wachtler v. Cuomo was successful in publicizing
the difficulties faced by the courts, there is no evidence that the
campaign mounted by the Chief Judge translated into public
support for the judiciary. There are several reasons why public
confidence in the courts may actually have eroded in the wake
of the suit. It is a political axiom that the greater the number of
interests injured by fiscal constraints, the smaller the likelihood
that any particular budget cut will be perceived by the public as
unfair.197 When the "pain" is spread more or less evenly, the
public will perceive the entire budget plan as a fair and neces-
sary, albeit unwelcome exercise. 198 For the executive faced with
the unpleasant task of selling the public on a budget which
slashes services, the spectacle of various interest groups each
clamoring for a larger piece of a shrinking budget pie actually
helps implement the overall budget strategy by persuading the
public of the fairness of the plan.199 When the Chief Judge
mounted his campaign to restore a judiciary cut of less than one
percent, he handed the Governor a better opportunity to ad-
vance this strategy than the Governor could have created him-
self. This explains the zeal with which the Governor seemed to
welcome the chance to engage the Chief Judge over the law-
195. Sidney H. Stein & Eric M. Schmidt, Can the Judiciary Compel the Legis-
lature to Increase Funding for the Courts?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 25, 1991, at 1; Is Gover-
nor Cuomo's Budget Unconstitutional?, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 1991, at 1.
196. Virginia Breen, Small Claims, Big Spats; Budget Cuts Slowing Justice to
a Crawl, NEWSDAY, Oct. 2, 1991, at 2.
197. This strategy was evident in President Clinton's first budget proposal.
David E. Rosenbaum, Clinton's Hope: Hostility; Oddly Enough If Everybody Finds
Fault In The Deficit Plan, The Better Its Chances, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, § 1, at
1 ("Representative Dan Rostenkowski, the Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee, has told the White House that it is politically crucial to create
such a large universe of sacrifice that it is difficult for people to say they should be
outside of it.").
198. Id.
199. Id.
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suit,200 and is one reason why public sympathy for the courts
did not materialize. 20 1
b. Diminishing the Stature of the Courts and the
Political Leadership
The judiciary's authority is uniquely dependent on public
confidence. 20 2 The image painted by the news reports and edito-
rials203 of a judiciary demanding priority allocations of scarce
budget resources ahead of competing social needs, cannot help
but diminish the stature of the courts in the public mind.204
Furthermore, when a court determines that its needs are para-
mount to other social concerns, and then orders the executive to
meet its needs it undermines the quality of impartiality upon
which public trust in the courts is based. 20 5 The editorials ex-
pressed particular dismay over the potential conflict, indicating
that the image of a court acting as prosecutor, judge, jury and
executioner struck a deep nerve.206
It may also be hard for the public to accept particular argu-
ments made to justify the exercise of inherent powers. For ex-
ample, it is often asserted that the courts are a virtually
helpless bystander in the budget negotiation process. 20 7 Can
this be true today, when the bar associations and court em-
ployee unions - which have a direct stake in the judicial
budget - are among the most powerful players in the political
arena? And since the overwhelming majority of legislators are
200. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 90, 107-108, 124-25 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ("The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword -
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."); see also
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2814 (1992). In Casey
the Supreme Court noted that the Court "cannot independently coerce obedience to
its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy.. .. "
203. See supra notes 90, 107-08, 125 and accompanying text.
204. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 165, 172 (Wash. 1976)
("The unreasoned assertion of power to determine and demand their own budget is
a threat to the image of and public support for the courts.").
205. Id. at 173 ("By in effect initiating and trying its own lawsuits, the judici-
ary's image of impartiality and the concomitant willingness of the public to accept
its decisions as those of a fair and disinterested tribunal may be severely
damaged.").
206. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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practicing attorneys,2 8 it cannot be argued that the legislature
fails to understand the needs of the courts. One might suppose
that lawyers lobbying other lawyers on the needs of the courts
would evoke more sympathy than would lobbying on subjects
further removed from their experience. The legislature's deci-
sion to reduce funding for the courts may well have a special
aura of credibility with the public precisely because of the legis-
lators' familiarity with and understanding of the court system.
The primary factual argument made by Chief Judge Wach-
tler could not withstand public scrutiny. The Chief Judge re-
peatedly claimed that the judiciary budget had. been
consistently cut by the Governor and the legislature. 20 9 In fact,
the budget had increased by $415 million (86%) since the Gover-
nor assumed office, and the actual cut at issue in the lawsuit
was under 1%.210 Only the judiciary's requests had been
trimmed, as the legislature was constitutionally entitled to
do. 211
It was not just the courts that suffered a loss of public confi-
dence as a result of Wachtler v. Cuomo. The credibility of the
political leadership as a whole suffered when the executive
branch called on the entire state to make sacrifices in the name
of fiscal recovery, 212 while the judicial branch engaged in ex-
traordinary conduct to avoid such sacrifices.
c. The Dangers of Success
Had the suit ultimately been successful in compelling the
funding of the judiciary budget, the negative effect on public
confidence in the courts could have been greater. The court is
ill-equipped to make broad judgments about the allocation of
resources to competing interests; its success in compelling fund-
ing undermines rational budget decisions by a representative
body.213 Furthermore, if the court's action results in a tax in-
208. Lawyers make up the largest group of state legislators nationwide. Eliz-
abeth Kolbert, Lawmaking for States Evolves into Full Time Job, N.Y. TIMES, June
4, 1989, at 26.
209. See Wachtler, at 10-13.
210. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 103, 113, 144 and accompanying text.
213. See In re Salary of the Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d 163, 172 (Wash. 1976)
("By its nature litigation based on inherent judicial power to finance its own func-
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crease or cuts in other programs in order to raise the level of
judicial funding, active public animosity toward the judiciary
would surely emerge.214 The damage to public confidence is fur-
ther exacerbated if the executive or legislature refuses to en-
force the order to compel funding. The court's essential
dependence on the other branches would be revealed, perhaps
crippling the court's authority in a substantial way.215 Thus,
whether the court wins, loses or settles the case, but perhaps
especially if it is won, the court seeking to exercise its inherent
power at the state level may be risking much more in terms of
public confidence than it stands to gain by adding a few - or
even a great many - dollars to its budget. The loss of public
trust and the increase in inter-branch tension may impair the
functioning of the court in a more fundamental way than a lean
budget appropriation. The budget money will rise and ebb with
the currents of the economy; the public trust, once lost, is not so
easily regained. Wachtler v. Cuomo suggests that a court con-
sidering the exercise of inherent power must think hard about
the effects of its action on its relationship with the public, for
such concerns may be more determinative of the efficacy of the
exercise than a carefully parsed legal and theoretical analysis.
VI. Conclusion: The Implications of Wachtler v. Cuomo for
the Future of Inherent Powers
Wachtler v. Cuomo provides evidence for the conclusion
that the doctrine of inherent power cannot and should not be
pushed beyond its conceptual, precedential, and practical lim-
its. As a conceptual matter, a use of the doctrine that under-
mines rather than strengthens the separation of powers is
unsupportable.
tions ignores the political allocation of available monetary resources by representa-
tives of the people elected in a carefully monitored process.").
214. Id. ("[S]uch actions may threaten, rather than strengthen, judicial inde-
pendence since involvement in the budgetary process imposes upon the courts at
least partial responsibility for increased taxes and diminished funding of other
public services.").
215. The executive might indeed relish the opportunity to display the court's
impotence after a bruising interbranch conflict; as President Jackson is reputed to
have said of one disagreeable Supreme Court holding, "John Marshall has made
his decision; now let him enforce it." E. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 194 (1919).
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Viewed in historical perspective, the critical use of the doc-
trine as applied to funding is when court budgeting lay in the
hands of local legislators and judges with little expertise in
modern court management. It serves as a useful tool for local
courts to protect themselves from becoming overly subservient
to local politicians. But when unitary financing and lump-sum
budgeting replace a fragmented process of line-item appropria-
tions, the doctrine of inherent powers outlives its usefulness.
Furthermore, the judicially created limitations on inherent
powers that control the use of the power by local courts are inef-
fective when the doctrine is applied by a state supreme court in
a conflict with its constitutional partners. Finally, by using in-
herent power as a weapon to coerce a co-equal branch of govern-
ment to fund the courts at a judicially mandated level, the
courts undermine the public confidence and interbranch cooper-
ation on which they ultimately depend.
All of the significant boundaries of the doctrine are violated
by the judiciary's use of inherent power as an alternative to the
state budget process. The attempt by Wachtler v. Cuomo to as-
sert inherent power as a response to chronic budget problems at
the state level ignores the roots and limits of the doctrine. The
traditional use of the doctrine as a means of protecting the sov-
ereignty of local courts against attacks by other local govern-
ment entities will survive Wachtler. Although attempts to
assert the doctrine beyond its historical and theoretical borders
will undoubtedly persist as long as the states are pressed by
tight fiscal constraints, it is unlikely that these exercises will be
successful. Even the court which wins funding through an in-
herent power suit stands to lose power, prestige, and effective-
ness while inflicting damage on its coordinate branches and
creating a substantively irrational state budget. The ultimate
implication of Wachtler v. Cuomo is that all parties emerge as
losers in an inherent powers conflict of this nature, no matter
what the legal outcome of the exercise.
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